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Canary in the Cloud Mine: Stealthy Tripwires to Detect Post-Breach Activity

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

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Canary in Cloud Mine

Stealthy Tripwires to Detect Post-Breach Activity

Agenda



- Why?
- Deceptive defenses
- Cloud is different
- Examples
- A research and design approach
- Implementation challenges

Blizzard 3/8/24

Attackers are winning with stealthy techniques

Russian threat actors attacking Microsoft using OAuth apps for privilege escalation & persistence



Malicious use of OAuth applications

Threat actors like Midnight Blizzard compromise user accounts to create, mod and grant high permissions to OAuth applications that they can misuse to hide malicious activity. The misuse of OAuth also enables threat actors to maintain access to applications, even if they lose access to the initially compromised account. Midnight Blizzard leveraged their initial access to identify and compromise a legacy test OAuth application that had elevated access to the Microsoft corporate environment. The actor created additional malicious OAut applications. They created a new user account to grant consent in the Microso corporate environment to the actor controlled malicious OAuth applications. T threat actor then used the legacy test OAuth application to grant them the Oft 365 Exchange Online *full_access_as_app* role, which allows access to mailboxes

Initial access thr gh password spray

Midnight Blizzard utilized password spray attacks that successfully compr legacy, non-production test tenant account that did not have multifactor authentication (MFA) enabled. In a password-spray attack, the adversary a to sign into a large volume of accounts using a small subset of the most f

Storm-0558 7/11/23

Attackers are winning with stolen keys, forged tokens and chained attacks.

Chinese threat actors attacking Microsoft using MSA & enterprise keys for privilege escalation & persistence


Microsoft mitigates China-based threat actor Storm-0558
of customer email
Details
Microsoft investigations determined that Storm-0558 gained access to customer email accounts using Outlook Web Access in Exchange On
(OWA) and Outlook.com by forging authentication tokens to access user email.
The actor used an acquired MSA key to forge tokens to access OWA and Outlook.com. MSA (consumer) keys and Azure AD (enterprise) key
issued and managed from separate systems and should only be valid for their respective systems. The actor exploited a token validation iss
impersonate Azure AD users and gain access to enterprise mail. We have no indications that Azure AD keys or any other MSA keys were use
this actor. OWA and Outlook.com are the only services where we have observed the actor using tokens forged with the acquisition of the Microsoft account consumer signing
on September 6, 2023, we publish
revealed that beginning
cloud including government agencies as
by using forged authentication tokens to access user email
completed mitigation of this attack for all customers.

Storm-0558 7/11/23

Attackers are winning with stolen keys, forged tokens and chained attacks. Defense is hard.

Chinese threat actors attacking Microsoft using MSA & enterprise keys for privilege escalation & persistence

1. In April 2021, a system used to generate signing keys for the consumer Microsoft services crashed and generated a Windows crash dump. These dumps should never include cryptographic keys, but in this case, an unspecified bug ("race condition") allowed the key material to be copied from RAM to the crash dump file.
2. The system that's supposed to scan crash dumps for sensitive data didn't detect the presence of the key data in the dump file, again because of an unspecified bug.
3. As part of normal debugging, the crash dump was moved to Microsoft's corporate network that's connected to the Internet. The corporate network is where Microsoft personnel, including engineers, work. The credential-scanning tools on the debugging network didn't detect the key data there either. Microsoft didn't say that this was because of a bug, probably because their credential scanner is looking for actual credentials and not just key material.
4. Microsoft updated a set of internal libraries used for validating cryptographic signatures. These libraries were meant to be shared between their consumer and enterprise services, but because they did a bad job of the updates, the libraries didn't properly enforce the intended separation of scope between the consumer and enterprise services. I'll score this as another bug.
5. Because Microsoft did a bad job of documenting the changes (the ones they did a bad job of implementing), "developers in the mail system" relied on the (non-working) libraries to catch scope violations of the type the attackers used.

Storm-2372 2/14/25

Attackers are winning by exploiting OAuth, PRTs, device registration trust, and SSO.

Russian threat actors attacking organizations using OAuth device code phishing, device registration to obtain Primary Refresh Token



February 14, 2025 update:

Within the past 24 hours, Microsoft has observed Storm-2372 shifting to using the specific client ID for Microsoft Authentication Broker in the device code sign-in flow. Using this client ID enables Storm-2372 to receive a refresh token that can be used to request another token for the device registration service, and then register an actor-controlled device within Entra ID. With the same refresh token and the new device identity, Storm-2372 is able to obtain a Primary Refresh Token (PRT) and access an organization's resources. We have observed Storm-2372 using the connected device to collect emails.

We don’t know
what we don’t know

But we do know sophisticated techniques continue to evolve…

- Enumeration without logging (N.Frichette DC31 '23, Rhinolabs pacu, Sharepoint/OneDrive enumeration @nyxgeek '20/'23)
- Access/Persistence by exploiting GCP Cloud Shell open ports, cached credentials, persistence (H.Lin DC32 '24, Netskope DC28 '20)
- Phishing/Access/Persistence/Privesc by compromising OAuth flows, SSO (Storm '23, Blizzard '24, @DrAzureAD/Dr. Nestori Synamaa '20, SecureWorks DC30 ‘22) **Storm-2372 2/14/25**
- Access/Privesc by exploiting Google server-side scripting and loose OAuth permissions (@iamandatory DC29 '21)
- Access/Persistence/Privesc by exploiting service principals, managed identities, admin roles, cross-tenant access (S.Metcalf, Z.Mackie, E.Woodruff, K.Fosaaen DC32 '24)
- Evasion/Persistence by exploiting GCP temporary project delete state and OAuth apps/tokens (GCP Ghost Token, Asterix DC31 '23)
- Phishing for Primary Refresh Tokens and Windows Hello keys (https://dirkjanm.io/phishing-for-microsoft-entra-primary-refresh-tokens, ‘23) **Storm-2372 2/14/25**

Assume Breach



Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results...

Premise
Fight
Stealth
With
Stealth

Attack Chain and TTPs

MATRICES

Enterprise
- PRE
- Windows
- macOS
- Linux
- Cloud
  - Office Suite
  - Identity Provider
  - SaaS
  - IaaS
- Network
- Containers

Mobile

ICS

IaaS Matrix

Below are the tactics and techniques representing the MITRE ATT&CK® IaaS platform. The techniques below are known to target cloud-based infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) platforms. IaaS encompasses cloud-hosted infrastructure, such as virtual machines, object storage, databases, and serverless functionality. The Matrix contains information for the IaaS platform.

View on the ATT&CK® Navigator

Version Permalink

layout: side | show sub-techniques | hide sub-techniques | help

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Impact
3 techniques	4 techniques	6 techniques	4 techniques	9 techniques	8 techniques	14 techniques	2 techniques	4 techniques	2 techniques	8 techniques
Exploit Public-Facing Application	Cloud Administration Command	Account Manipulation (3)	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (1)	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (1)	Brute Force (3)	Account Discovery (1)	Remote Services (2)	Automated Collection	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Account Access Removal
Trusted Relationship	Command and Scripting Interpreter (1)	Create Account (1)	Account Manipulation (3)	Exploitation for Defense Evasion	Credentials from Password Stores (1)	Cloud Infrastructure Discovery	Use Alternate Authentication Material (2)	Data from Cloud Storage	Transfer Data to Cloud Account	Data Destruction (1)
Valid Accounts (2)	Serverless Execution	Event Triggered Execution	Event Triggered Execution	Impair Defenses (3)	Forge Web Credentials (2)	Cloud Service Dashboard		Data from Information Repositories		Data Encrypted for Impact
	User Execution (1)	Implant Internal Image	Valid Accounts (2)	Modify Authentication Process (3)	Modify Authentication Process (3)	Cloud Service Discovery		Data Staged (1)		Defacement (1)
		Modify Authentication Process (3)		Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure (5)	Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation	Cloud Storage Object Discovery				Endpoint Denial of Service (3)
		Valid Accounts (2)		Modify Cloud Resource Hierarchy	Network Sniffing	Log Enumeration				Inhibit System Recovery
				Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions	Steal Application Access Token	Network Service Discovery				Network Denial of Service (2)
				Use Alternate Authentication Material (2)	Unsecured Credentials (2)	Network Sniffing				Resource Hijacking (2)
				Valid Accounts (2)		Password Policy Discovery				
						Permission Groups Discovery (1)				
						Software Discovery (1)				

MITRE Engage

Cyber Denial prevents or impairs the adversary's operations.

Cyber Deception reveals and conceals deceptive facts and fictions to mislead and confuse the adversary.

When used together with strategic **Planning & Analysis**, they provide a foundation for **Adversary Engagement**.



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PR_21-01759-21 Last updated: 2/28/2022 Version: 1.0

MITRE Engage Matrix

Prepare	Expose		Affect			Elicit		Understand
Plan	**Collect**	**Detect**	**Prevent**	**Direct**	**Disrupt**	**Reassure**	**Motivate**	**Analyze**
Cyber Threat Intelligence	API Monitoring	Introduced Vulnerabilities	Baseline	Attack Vector Migration	Isolation	Application Diversity	Application Diversity	After-Action Review
Engagement Environment	Network Monitoring	Lures	Hardware Manipulation	Email Manipulation	Lures	Artifact Diversity	Artifact Diversity	Cyber Threat Intelligence
Gating Criteria	Software Manipulation	Malware Detonation	Isolation	Introduced Vulnerabilities	Network Manipulation	Burn-In	Information Manipulation	Threat Model
Operational Objective	System Activity Monitoring	Network Analysis	Network Manipulation	Lures	Software Manipulation	Email Manipulation	Introduced Vulnerabilities	
Persona Creation			Security Controls	Malware Detonation		Information Manipulation	Malware Detonation	
Storyboarding				Network Manipulation		Network Diversity	Network Diversity	
Threat Model				Peripheral Management		Peripheral Management	Personas	
				Security Controls		Pocket Litter		
				Software Manipulation				

MITRE Engage

- Deploy Persona(s) and Deceptive Assets to Engagement Environment
  - Build active directory, file/app server
  - Connect client to environment
  - Litter both server and client(s)
  - Establish connectivity that aligns with storyboard and persona(s) (i.e. teleworker with a VPN)

- Establish Monitoring System
- Deploy Monitoring System
- Monitor Operational Activity



MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK LIST (METL)

The following is intended to serve as an exemplary METL for a generic adversary engagement team. The METL is made up of a series of Mission Essential Tasks (METs). These tasks are the core activities that must be completed during the planning, execution, or analysis phases of an engagement operation. These METs should drive progress towards the operational outcome.

- Establish Gating Criteria
  - Identify exit criteria and appropriate escalation procedures
  - Define operational success
  - Establish acceptable level of risk
  - Define acceptable response time
- Create Engagement Narrative
  - Create persona(s)
  - Determine storyboarding
  - Select pocket litter
  - Define pattern of life for persona(s)
- Establish Monitoring System
  - Build out the collection system
  - Include/establish dashboards for default searches/queries
  - Establish additional systems needed for monitoring
- Build Out Victim Windows System
  - Build computer/system(s) to meet the mission objective/ requirements
  - Use Microsoft Deployment Toolkit for operating system deployment
  - Use tools for software provisioning, configuration management, and application-deployment (e.g. Ansible)
- Build Out Victim Linux System
  - Same as Windows but Linux specific

- Deploy Monitoring System to Engagement Environment
  - Deploy collection system
  - Establish security controls
- Deploy Persona(s) and Deceptive Assets to Engagement Environment
  - Build active directory, file/app server
  - Connect client to environment
  - Litter both server and client(s)
  - Establish connectivity that aligns with storyboard and persona(s) (i.e. teleworker with a VPN)
- Monitor Operational Activity
  - Conduct overwatch and observation
  - Identify basic persistence
  - Identify network activity of interest
  - Identify probable lateral movement
- Forensically Investigate Victim Post Operation
  - Collect disk and memory image
  - Process disk/memory image in to establish timeline of artifacts (e.g. log2timeline/plaso)

- Analyze Data from Live Operation and Forensic Investigation
  - Identify artifacts from live operational data in the post-op at rest data
  - Document findings
  - Inform existing threat model and CTI data
- Conduct Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) Searches Pre/Post Operation
  - Search for related network activity (ip/domain)
  - Search for related on-system activity (e.g. persistence mechanism)

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MITRE's mission-driven teams are dedicated to solving problems for a safer world. Through our public-private partnerships and federally funded R&D centers, we work across government and

MITRE D3FEND



MITRE D3FEND



A Story


$ rm -f /usr/bin/ls
$ cat <<EOF > /usr/bin/ls
#!/bin/sh
shutdown now
EOF
$ chmod +x /usr/bin/ls
$ echo *
bin dev etc home opt sbin tmp usr var
$

Concepts

chokepoint

```
$
```

common traversal

tripwire

```
$ ls
Connection to
104.75.99.206 closed
by remote host.
```

hidden trigger

landmine | grenade

```
$ rm -f /usr/bin/ls

$ cat<<EOF >/usr/bin/ls
#!/bin/sh
shutdown now
EOF

$ chmod +x /usr/bin/ls
```

response

don't kill the good guys

```
$ echo *
bin dev etc home opt
sbin tmp usr var
```



no FPs

Cloud Attack Chain



Cloud Attack Chain: Discovery



Cloud Attack Chain: Identity Access



Cloud Attack Chain: Resource Access



Focus Areas

1. TTP: Discovery and Persistence

2. Identity Access (honey/canary tokens)
   - Account (Console, Perm Access Key)
   - Role (Temp Session Keys)

3. Resource Access (honey resources)
   - Storage (S3, EBS, EFS, FSx…)
   - Compute
   - EC2/EKS (Compute)
   - CloudShell (Interactive Compute)
   - Lambda/FarGate (Serverless)
   - Images (AMI/ECR)

   - Databases(RDS, Aurora, DynamoDB, ElastiCache, Neptune, Timestream…)

   - Analytics (Athena, Redshift, Glue, EMR, OpenSearch)
   - Data Lake (Lake Formation, Glue Catalog)

Dimensions

1. Environment Location
   - Internal vs External (what is your perimeter?)
   - EC2 (services…obvious)
   - CloudShell (interactive…less obvious)
   - Endpoint (CLI/VPN…is inside your perimeter)
   - Images (service config…AMI / ECR / SOAR / IaaC)

2. Attack Chain Stage and Timing
   - Enumeration (pre vs post auth)
   - Initial Access vs Persistence
   - Access vs Use (compute, images)

3. Decoy
   - Purloined, Honey, Privileged, Eunach

4. Defense Rotation
   - Dynamic vs static (don’t confuse yourself)
   - External vs internal threats (who knows what when)
   - Open sniff test (even if you know my methods…)

Discovery (Policies)

1. List managed policies attached to the user
   - `aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name YourUserName`

2. For each managed policy (e.g., AdministratorAccess), get the policy document
   - `aws iam get-policy --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess`
   - `aws iam get-policy-version --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess --version-id v1`

3. List inline policies attached to the user
   - `aws iam list-user-policies --user-name YourUserName`

4. For each inline policy (e.g., MyInlinePolicy1), get the policy document:
   - `aws iam get-user-policy --user-name YourUserName --policy-name MyInlinePolicy1`

AWS Policy

```
# attached: random_role
{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {   "Sid": "230616func",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "sts:AssumeRole"
            ],
            "Resource": [

"arn:aws:iam::4973*******90:role/admin_role"
            ]
        },
        {   "Sid": "230615data",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "s3:Get*",
                "s3:List*"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::finance.acme.com"
        },
        {   "Sid": "230615dataobj",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "s3:Get*",
                "s3:List*"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::test.gleeze.co/*"
        },
        {   "Sid": "roleInspection",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "iam:List*",
                "iam:Get*"   ],
            "Resource": [

"arn:aws:iam::4973*******90:role/my_admin_policy",

"arn:aws:iam::4973*******90:role/my_support_policy"
            ]
        },
        {   "Sid": "policyInspection",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "iam:List*",
                "iam:Get*"   ],
            "Resource": [

"arn:aws:iam::4973******90:policy/my_admin_policy",

"arn:aws:iam::4973******90:policy/my_support_policy"
            ]
        },
        {   "Sid": "stsCallerId",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "sts:GetCallerIdentity"
            ],
            "Resource": "*"
        }
    ]
}
```

Discovery (Role Trust)

1. List All Roles in the Account
   - `aws iam list-roles --query 'Roles[*].RoleName' --output text`

2. Compare with Role Trust Policies
   - `aws iam get-role --role-name <role-name> --query 'Role.AssumeRolePolicyDocument'`

```
{
  "Effect": "Allow",
  "Principal": {
    "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:user/YourUserName"
  },
  "Action": "sts:AssumeRole"
}
```

AWS Policy: Chokepoint

```
# attached: random_role
{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {   "Sid": "230616func",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "sts:AssumeRole"
            ],
            "Resource": [
                "arn:aws:iam::4973*******90:role/Administrator"
            ]
        },
        {   "Sid": "230615data",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "s3:Get*",
                "s3:List*"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::finance.acme.com"
        },
        {   "Sid": "230615dataobj",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "s3:Get*",
                "s3:List*"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::finance.acme.com/*"
        },
```

tripwire role

tripwire resources

```
        {   "Sid": "roleInspection",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "iam:List*",
                "iam:Get*"
            ],
            "Resource": [
                "arn:aws:iam::4973*******90:role/my_admin_policy",
                "arn:aws:iam::4973*******90:role/my_support_policy"
            ]
        },
        {   "Sid": "policyInspection",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "iam:List*",
                "iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion",
            "Resource": [
                "arn:aws:iam::4973******90:policy/my_admin_policy",
                "arn:aws:iam::4973******90:policy/my_support_policy"
            ]
        },
        {   "Sid": "stsCallerId",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "sts:GetCallerIdentity"
            ],
            "Resource": "*"
        }
    ]
}
```

tripwire perms

Tools: Tripwires

Enumeration

TTP

No Logging

```
$ cat ~/pkgs/pacu/pacu/modules/iam__enum_roles/default-word-list.txt
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
A
ADS
API
APIGateway
AWS
Aaron
Abram
Account
…
Admin
Administrator
Agustin
Ai
Alert_Logic_Cloud_Defender
Alexa
AlexaForBusiness
```

Canary/Honey Tokens: Identity Access



- Access keys (5K users x 2 keys)
- Session tokens (unlimited…)
- Timeouts (EC2 Role 1hr vs IAM User 12hrs)
- EC2 as a canary factor
- Placement (tripwire)

Step-by-step example on an EC2 instance:

1. Determine the EC2 instance ID and other information that might be useful to uniquely identify this server such as application name. You can do this by querying the Instance Metadata Service (IMDS)
2. Use the IAM User credential to AssumeRole into the honeytoken role using a session name of the instance ID and other information as described in 1. Ex. <appname>-i-12313132
3. Receive the temporary credentials back from AWS
4. Write the credentials to a file where an adversary might find them. (~/.aws/credentials)
5. Repeat 2–4 prior to credential expiration (ex. Every 50 minutes)

Netflix Security Team
https://medium.com/@williambengtson/zero-maintenance-aws-canary-tokens-that-scale-b470c6f60da

AWS Compute Credentials: Identity Access



Netflix Security Team
https://medium.com/swlh/active-defense-dynamically-locking-aws-credentials-to-your-environment-47a9c920e704
https://github.com/Netflix-Skunkworks/aws-metadata-proxy

AWS Compute Credentials: Identity Access



Netflix Security Team
https://medium.com/swlh/active-defense-dynamically-locking-aws-credentials-to-your-environment-47a9c920e704
https://github.com/Netflix-Skunkworks/aws-metadata-proxy

AWS Compute Credentials: Identity Access, Neutered




```
{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Action": "*",
            "Resource": "*",
            "Effect": "Deny",
            "Condition": {
                "NotIpAddress": {
                    "aws:SourceIp": [
                        "52.13.101.11/32"
                    ]
                },
                "StringNotEquals": {
                    "aws:SourceVpc": [
                        "vpc-12345678"
                    ],
                    "aws:SourceVpce": [
                        "vpce-12345678"
                    ]
                }
            }
        },
        {
            "Action": "*",
            "Resource": "*",
            "Effect": "Allow"
        },
        {
            "Action": "sts:AssumeRole",
            "Resource": "arn:aws:iam::12344567890:role/RoleName",
            "Effect": "Deny"
        }
```

Netflix Security Team
https://medium.com/swlh/active-defense-dynamically-locking-aws-credentials-to-your-environment-47a9c920e704
https://github.com/Netflix-Skunkworks/aws-metadata-proxy

Cached External Credentials: Location

- ~/.aws/credentials
- ~/.azure/msal_token_cache.json

Token Hijacking for API Calls

We just showed how we can easily copy the cached credentials en masse and access the user's GCP environments. We can also pull out the OAuth tokens from the cache and use them directly to execute API calls instead of the CLI.

Let's look back at the sqlite database files in ~/.config/gcloud. The file, access_tokens.db, contains the current OAuth access token, while credentials.db contains the refresh token, the OAuth client id/secret, scopes, and other information.

```
sqlite3 ~/.config/gcloud/access_tokens.db "select access_token from
access_tokens where account_id = 'admin@prod-mfa-hw.com';"
```

```
target-host:~ $ sqlite3 ~/.config/gcloud/access_tokens.db "select access_token from
access_tokens where account_id = 'admin@prod-mfa-hw.com';"
ya29.yt2YtZ2QtMv1JVn7/aO/VUFxt6FrU+ZOviUONXiC9FxtzGZmoEvn3Fdwoisp/+M7LvqCEZeGH+eQOpA
d4cSPZgY9pMX/uf9gzBTYkKPDloBsYUVhQsfv2pZkc0mhlwye+3KIMyaSjh04Z3/zgpdL+boP+u+hZfcJmfV
hYW+WYmYgmw7Y
```

AWS EC2 Resource Access: Timing

```
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "ssm:StartSession",
        "ssm:DescribeInstanceInformation",
        "ssm:DescribeSessions",
        "ssm:TerminateSession"
      ],
      "Resource": "arn:aws:ec2:region:account-
id:instance/instance-id"
    },
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "ssm:SendCommand",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:ec2:region:account-
id:instance/instance-id"
    }
  ]
}
```

```
{
  "eventVersion": "1.08",
  "userIdentity": {
    "type": "IAMUser",
    "userName": "jdoe",
    "arn": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:user/jdoe",
    "accountId": "123456789012",
    ...
  },
  "eventTime": "2025-04-12T16:45:31Z",
  "eventSource": "ssm.amazonaws.com",
  "eventName": "StartSession",
  "awsRegion": "us-east-1",
  "sourceIPAddress": "198.51.100.25",
  "userAgent": "ssm-session",
  "errorCode": "AccessDenied",
  "errorMessage": "User: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:user/jdoe is not
authorized to perform: ssm:StartSession on resource: arn:aws:ec2:us
east-1:123456789012:instance/i-0abcdef1234567890",
  "requestParameters": {
    "target": "i-0abcdef1234567890"
  },
  "responseElements": null,
  "requestID": "b1a1dbe3-d7b1-4e91-917f-aaaaaaaaaaaa",
  "eventID": "c7c1fdd6-5c69-48b7-bc77-bbbbbbbbbbbb",
  "readOnly": false,
  "eventType": "AwsApiCall",
  "managementEvent": true,
  "recipientAccountId": "123456789012"
}
```

AWS S3 Resource Access: id and don't kill the bad guys

```
aws s3 list-buckets
```



Amazon S3

```
aws s3api list-objects-v2 --bucket your-bucket
```

```
.
└── digitised/
    └── b21466154/
        └── v1/
            ├── bag-info.txt
            ├── bagit.txt
            ├── manifest-sha256.txt
            ├── ...3 other objects
            └── data/
                ├── b21466154.xml
                ├── b21466154_0001.xml
                ├── b21466154_0002.xml
                ├── b21466154_0003.xml
                ├── alto/
                │   ├── b21466154_0001_0001.xml
                │   ├── b21466154_0001_0002.xml
                │   ├── b21466154_0001_0003.xml
                │   └── ...1263 other objects
                └── objects/
                    ├── b21466154_0001_0001.jp2
                    ├── b21466154_0001_0002.jp2
                    ├── b21466154_0001_0003.jp2
                    └── ...1263 other objects
```

AWS AssumeRole: id and don't kill the bad guys

```
# attached: random_role
{
    "Version": "2012-10-1
    "Statement": [
        {   "Sid": "2306
            "Effect": "Al
            "Action": [
                "sts:Assu
            ],
            "Resource":

"arn:aws:iam::4973******
            ]
        },
        {   "Sid": "2306
            "Effect": "Al
            "Action": [
                "s3:Get*"
                "s3:List*
            ],
            "Resource": "
        },
        {   "Sid": "2306
            "Effect": "Al
            "Action": [
                "s3:Get*"
                "s3:List*
            ],
            "Resource": "
        },
```

```
{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "AllowIamUserAssumeRole",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": "sts:AssumeRole",
            "Principal": {"AWS": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:user/test
            "Condition": {
                "StringLike": {
                    "aws:RequestTag/Project": "*",
                    "aws:RequestTag/CostCenter": "*",
                    "aws:RequestTag/Department": "*"
                },
                "StringEquals": {"sts:ExternalId": "Example987"}
            }
        },
```

AWS AssumeRole: id and don't kill the bad guys

```
# attached: random_role
{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {   "Sid": "230616func",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                                    explicit
            ],
            "Re

"arn:aws:iam::4
            ]
        },
        {   "Si
            "Ef
            "Ac


            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::finance.acme.com"
        },
        {   "Sid": "230615dataobj",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "s3:Get*",
                "s3:List*"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::test.gleeze.co/*"
        },
```

```
aws sts assume-role \
--role-arn arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/Role1 \
--role-session-name Session1 \
--tags Key=Star,Value=1 Key=Heart,Value=1 \
--transitive-tag-keys Star Heart
```

```
        {   "Sid": "roleInspection",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                                                    _policy",
"arn:aws:iam::4973*******90:role/my_support_policy"
            ]
        },
        {   "Sid": "policyInspection",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
```

Attack Chain and TTPs

MATRICES

Enterprise
- PRE
- Windows
- macOS
- Linux
- Cloud
  - Office Suite
  - Identity Provider
  - SaaS
  - IaaS
- Network
- Containers

Mobile

ICS

IaaS Matrix

Below are the tactics and techniques representing the MITRE ATT&CK® IaaS platform. The techniques below are known to target cloud-based infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) platforms. IaaS encompasses cloud-hosted infrastructure, such as virtual machines, object storage, databases, and serverless functionality. The Matrix contains information for the IaaS platform.

View on the ATT&CK® Navigator

Version Permalink

layout: side | show sub-techniques | hide sub-techniques | help

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Impact
3 techniques	4 techniques	6 techniques	4 techniques	9 techniques	8 techniques	14 techniques	2 techniques	4 techniques	2 techniques	8 techniques
Exploit Public-Facing Application	Cloud Administration Command	Account Manipulation (3)	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (1)	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (1)	Brute Force (3)	Account Discovery (1)	Remote Services (2)	Automated Collection	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Account Access Removal
Trusted Relationship	Command and Scripting Interpreter (1)	Create Account (1)	Account Manipulation (3)	Exploitation for Defense Evasion	Credentials from Password Stores (1)	Cloud Infrastructure Discovery	Use Alternate Authentication Material (2)	Data from Cloud Storage	Transfer Data to Cloud Account	Data Destruction (1)
Valid Accounts (2)	Serverless Execution	Event Triggered Execution	Event Triggered Execution	Impair Defenses (3)	Forge Web Credentials (2)	Cloud Service Dashboard		Data from Information Repositories		Data Encrypted for Impact
	User Execution (1)	Implant Internal Image	Valid Accounts (2)	Modify Authentication Process (3)	Modify Authentication Process (3)	Cloud Service Discovery		Data Staged (1)		Defacement (1)
		Modify Authentication Process (3)		Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure (5)	Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation	Cloud Storage Object Discovery				Endpoint Denial of Service (3)
		Valid Accounts (2)		Modify Cloud Resource Hierarchy	Network Sniffing	Log Enumeration				Inhibit System Recovery
				Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions	Steal Application Access Token	Network Service Discovery				Network Denial of Service (2)
				Use Alternate Authentication Material (2)	Unsecured Credentials (2)	Network Sniffing				Resource Hijacking (2)
				Valid Accounts (2)		Password Policy Discovery				
						Permission Groups Discovery (1)				
						Software Discovery (1)				

Cloud

chokepoint

- discovery: enumeration actions (List*) /
- resource access
- identity access: compute instances, cloud shells...
- Location: cached external creds

tripwire

- multiple resource tripwires (purloined signposts)
- default admin (privileged)
- fake admin (honey)
- mitm: restrict and monitor VM creds (neutered)
- CLI, cloud shell honey credentials

landmine | grenade

- revoke access
- alerting
- increase logging and monitoring
- risk range with incremental risk adjustments

don't kill the good guys

- multiple signposts: README.txt / MOTD
- interactive, real-time verification
- restricted enumeration
- custom, restricted admin roles
- admin role access (signed/tagged)
- expected changes (CCM, signed/tagged)

Approach

- Design-based (CSP, tools, TTP)
- Enumeration (resources, security principals)
- Access (resources, security principals)
- Common attack vectors (compute environments, external cached credentials, priv esc, data,…persistence)
- Rethink the perimeter (endpoints, internal interactive, images/volumes)
- Integrate across design-dev-devops-admin-ops-hunt-risk (noisy enumeration indicators + downstream activity == higher fidelity, M/L)
- Complementary: Find the good (validated users/actions)

Considerations

- Ignore, Buy, Build
  - Resources / Priorities
  - Motivation / Difficulty
  - Priorities / Money
- Cost and Integration
  - Admin Hooks | Usability
  - CLI | Console | CI/CD
  - Out-of-band management + Audit Logs
  - 3rd-Party Apps (Admin)
- More risk
  - Attack surface and vulns
  - Misconfiguration
  - Malicious insider
  - Rotation
- Coverage and Confidence
  - Research (research, tools, CTFs, breaches, ATT&CK…)
  - Incremental rollout
- Testing and Efficacy
  - Historical Log Analysis
  - Red-team, bug bounties, CTFs
  - Scope: stealth/evasion, persistence, C2

Where to go from here



- In the next month
  - Review the slide deck, research, and examples
  - Determine if techniques are applicable to your environment
- In the next 3 months
  - Analyze risk, prioritize gaps
  - Analyze cost / benefit for building own deceptive defenses
  - Prioritize incremental rollouts with focus on low overhead
- In the next 6 months
  - Plan how to test and measure efficacy e.g., integration with red-team exercises
  - Review security vendor approaches to prevention/detection and discuss roadmap on deceptive defensives and signal fidelity

RSAC™ 2025 Conference

Many Voices.
One Community.

Thank you